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This is the first study of compliance costs of income taxation
of companies in India. These are costs to companies of obligations under
income tax law and in planning to save taxes. Opportunity costs such as
when tax refunds are delayed also included. Different cost concepts
include social costs, gross versus net private costs and mandatory
versus voluntary costs. Gross private costs include both legal expenses
and illegal expenses such as bribes by companies on employees, on tax
advice and other non-labour expenses.
Estimates here are for the year 2000-01, based on a postal
survey of 45 companies throughout India in August-September 2001.
The response rate, at 1.15 percent, was disappointing. Since results are
based on a small sample, they should be viewed as tentative.
Gross compliance costs for 2000-01  are estimated at
between 5.6 and 14.5 percent of corporation tax revenues. The
estimates do not include bribe costs. Costs are to those elsewhere if they
are near the lower limit but a cause for concern near the upper limit. Tax
deductibility of legal expenses and cash flow benefits from the timing
difference between taxable income and payment of tax result in net
compliance costs of between  minus  0.7 and plus 0.6 percent of
corporation tax revenue, though these rise to around 2 percent when
opportunity costs are included. Net compliance cost estimates  do not
include an estimate of cash flow benefits of tax deductors. Both gross
and net compliance costs are regressive. Furthermore:
•  Most companies (62 percent) benefit from compliance requirements
as income statements and balance sheets are better prepared. 50
percent find audit requirements helpful in detecting dishonest
employees.
•  Twelve sample companies paid excess tax (median value: 46
percent of tax due) since tax evasion penalty is not leviable under
Indian law if assessed taxes have already been paid.
•  Answering  qeries during scrutiny assessment and accounting
requirements are the most costly activities.•  70 percent of companies, especially small companies use external
assistance to prepare tax returns.
•  External costs account for around 39 percent of the total legal costs
of sample companies.
•  Compulsory external financial audit is the main source of fees of
external professionals. Other important sources are litigation and
providing assistance to company employees.
•  Voluntary costs are estimated to lie between 19 and 43 percent of
total compliance costs.
•  The average sample company had 10 to 11 assessment years
locked in disputes for tax or penalty. Adding the time for scrutiny
assessments, the number of open assessment years of a typical
company is 12 to 14. Statistical analysis suggests that one extra
disputed assessment year raises legal compliance costs by 5.7
percent.
•  The time taken to close an assessment varies from 2 years if no tax
dispute arises to over 20 years if a dispute goes to the Supreme
Court.
•  Incorrect application of tax laws by tax  officials burden taxpayers
who have their tax assessments revisited. The most serious problem
is with valuation of closing stocks of companies followed by
underassessment of tax. Both of these are areas where assessing
officers have high discretion.
Reform suggestions include:
•  Tackling delayed refunds by streamlining refund procedures and
strengthening anti-corruption.
•  Improving taxpayer services for business.
•  Reducing discretionary powers of income tax officials, increasing
individual accountability and reducing occasions for direct contact
with taxpayers.
•  Regular post facto sampling and review of appeal cases to guard
against corruption at this stage.
•  Strengthening advance rulings and extending their scope.
•  Scrapping selected concessions where they are not matched by
commensurate social benefits.
•  Reform of 22 legal and procedural "hot spots" which add to
compliance costs.Estimation problems include qualitative rather than quantitative
questions about in-house cost components; assumed rather than the
actual opportunity cost of funds to value cash flow benefits; no
application of shadow values to estimate social compliance costs; and,
as in earlier studies, possible bias due to incorrect apportionment of fixed
costs and the value of time of company management.
Sampling problems include a stratified random design that
degenerated into a convenience sample; over-representation of large
firms; and under-representation of loss making and zero profit
companies.9
The Income Tax Compliance Cost




The objective of this study is to measure the cost of compliance
with the income tax of Indian corporations and ascertain how these costs
compare internationally. Besides aggregate estimates, (a) sources of
compliance costs and their break-up in terms of different compliance
activities and within sources, legal and illegal compliance costs, (c)
determinants of compliance costs in terms of firm characteristics and the
importance of mandatory obligations as against voluntary tax planning
activity are also studied.
In the next two sub-sections compliance costs are defined and
international evidence on compliance costs is reviewed. The study
sample is described in section 2. Estimates for the study sample and for
all Indian companies are in section 3. The association of compliance
costs with characteristics of surveyed firms  and  components of
compliance costs are then examined, in section 4. Section 5  reports
opinions of surveyed respondents about high compliance cost or "hot
spot" tax code provisions and administrative procedures. In Section 6,
conclusions of the study are  summarised and reform suggestions are
made.
______________________
* This paper is excerpted and condensed from a report on company compliance costs,
Chattopadhyaya and Das-Gupta (2002), prepared for the Planning Commission at the
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.  The report is available at the Planning
Commission website http://www.planingcommission.nic.in/reports.
**:Professor of Economics and Finance,  Goa Institute of Management,  Ribander,  Goa
403006, India. Phone: 91-832-2444638, E-mail: oldmonk87@yahoo.com.10
Defining and Measuring the Compliance Cost of Companies
Overall costs of a tax system include “welfare costs, opportunity
costs, psychic costs, social costs and so on
1”. To assess the total impact
of taxes on society, “the total sacrifice imposed upon the populace – total
collection costs, administrative and compliance costs, should be looked
into”
2. Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1996) identify compliance costs as one of
the five component costs of taxation. The others are administrative
costs, deadweight efficiency loss from taxation, the excess burden of tax
evasion and avoidance costs. Taxes themselves are merely a transfer of
purchasing power from the private to the government sector. Costs that
arise in effecting this transfer are what the  Slemrod-Yitzhaki analysis
points to. Compliance costs of taxpayers are, however, not the only
costs. All agents involved in facilitating this transfer of funds from the
private sector to the government exchequer incur costs. Such  third
party costs include, for example, costs of employers responsible for tax
deduction at source. Financial institutions collecting taxes also incur
third-party compliance costs.
In defining compliance costs of taxation, in this study, all costs
due to the tax system borne by taxpayers and third parties other than
cost arising from economic distortions and equity violations are included.
So both "genuine" compliance costs and avoidance costs are included
here as they are hard to distinguish in practice. Though costs of non-
compliance, including costs associated with tax evasion, are also
included in the definition adopted, in this study no specific information is
available on costs due to tax evasion.
3
For businesses, sources of tax compliance costs in most earlier
studies
4 have been subdivided into in-house personnel costs, other in-
house costs and external costs associated with retaining the services
of tax, accounting and legal  professionals.  Costs include  (a)  in-  house
                                                       
1  See Evans and Walpole (1997).
2  See Mikesell (1986).
3  However, some information is available on costs incurred to forestall accusations of tax
evasion. See section 4 and, for case studies, Chattopadhyay and Das-Gupta (2002).
4  See section 1.3 below.11
 costs incurred both by tax departments and by other departments,
5 (b)
external costs including bribes and gifts to government officials,  (c)
"Third party costs", such as tax collection cost of banks and costs of
others required to provide information to tax authorities and (d) in
principle, costs of non-filing for companies choosing not to file returns.
6
Costs as defined for this study include mandatory elements and
voluntary and  quasi-voluntary costs. Voluntary costs are mainly
associated with tax planning or avoidance to reduce tax liabilities. The
distinction between voluntary and mandatory costs has been made in
several earlier studies.
7
The major  activities  generating compliance costs of
companies include maintaining books of account, complying with tax
return filing obligations, obtaining taxpayer identification numbers,
clearances and permissions where required by law, tax avoidance or tax
planning to reduce tax liability, tax audits (or scrutinies as they are called
in India), appeals, court references and tax prosecutions. Also included
are costs of discharging statutory tax withholding obligations (tax
deduction at source or TDS in Indian parlance). A problem faced by
many earlier studies is that the extent to which some activities, such as
accounting, are undertaken for tax compliance as opposed to other
reasons is hard to ascertain. Of these, a major difficulty is in
apportionment of capital costs. Time costs of owners, directors and
proprietors have also been found to be difficult to estimate in earlier
studies.
  Compliance costs  of  the Income  tax  may  also  be  difficult   to
                                                       
5  That costs outside tax departments can be significant has been documented by Gunz,
McNaughton and Wensley (1995) and Porter (1999). The former focuses specifically on
costs of tax incentives for R and D which they find to be largely borne by research staff.
6  There are also psychic costs including mental stress suffered by the internal staff or tax
advisors, reviewed, for example, in Pope and Fayle (1991). Possibly more important are
costs imposed on society by business uncertainty due to frequent changes in tax
provisions and tax administration procedures. These are surveyed for individuals and
companies in Das-Gupta and Chattopadhyay (2002) and (2002a).
7  Further discussion is in Chattopadhyay and Das-Gupta (2002a).12
 separate from costs for other taxes.
8,9 As a result, internal costs
estimates are subject to a margin of error.
10
In terms of  objects of expenditure, wages, salaries and
allowances, stationery and supplies, rents and other overheads,
computer hardware and software costs and travel are some of the major
items. Acquiring tax knowledge, training  costs, and membership fees
paid to representative bodies and lobbying for taxation matters are also
present.
The discussion so far pertains to gross compliance costs. Net
compliance costs are the difference between gross compliance costs
and the value of  benefits from compliance activities. The  tax
deductibility of compliance cost expenditure is also taken into
account in computing net costs.
11 The major benefit is from the
augmented cash flow due to the time elapsing between tax becoming
liable and remittance of tax. This is true both for TDS agents and also for
the corporation tax itself. Estimates of these cash flow benefits are
sensitive to the opportunity cost of funds assumed, as also to
assumptions made about the timing of cash accruals and
disbursements.
12 Benefits also arise from better record keeping and
improved management control, though these are difficult to quantify.
Since most monetary compliance costs are deductible, private
costs are typically less than the social costs. To arrive at social or real
resource costs, tax deductions for compliance expenditure must be
added back to gross private costs and bribes, which are inter-agent
transfers, must be netted out.
                                                       
8  Good discussions are in Sandford, Hardwick and Godwin (1989), and Pope and Fayle
(1991).
9  However, a case study reported in Chattopadhyay and Das-Gupta (2002) suggests that
estimates in this study are largely for the corporate income tax and not for all taxes paid
by corporations.
10 For example, compliance cost estimates for corporations in the USA in  Slemrod and
Venkatesh (2002) are almost 10 times as high  as those in  Slemrod and  Blumenthal
(1996).  Part of the reason is a difference in samples.
11 See Binh, et. al. (2000).
12 A discussion of this issue is in Pope and Fayle (1991).13
In measuring compliance costs, there is possibly no alternative
to taxpayer surveys. Respondent bias and non-response bias have
been warned against by Wallschutzky & Gibson (1993) and all survey
based studies are subject to such bias.
Conclusions from Earlier Compliance Cost Studies of
Companies
In all, around 50 studies of compliance costs of companies in
around 20 different countries have been conducted since the 1960s.
13
The studies vary widely in their scope, coverage and methodology
adopted. Indian studies include Export Import Bank of India (1998) on
the compliance cost of Indian exporters with export and customs
procedures and Sridharan (1999) on business compliance costs in India
with Central customs and excise duties. However, their estimates, to the
extent that they deal with similar costs, differ widely. Furthermore, they
do not cover the income tax, which is the focus of this study.
The major conclusions from earlier studies are (a) that
compliance costs of corporations are large relative to tax
administration costs and (b) that compliance costs are  regressive
regardless of the measure of size adopted.
14,15 In fact net compliance
costs of large corporations have been found to be negative for
corporations in Australia.
16
Though it is widely believed that simplification could improve
compliance by lowering compliance costs, evidence available does not
provide unambiguous evidence of this in all cases.
17 Consequently, tax
simplification and reducing compliance costs should be treated as
possibly distinct and in certain cases, even conflicting objectives.
                                                       
13 Studies are reviewed in Annex 1.1 of Chattopadhyay and Das-Gupta (2002).
14 Common size measures include employee strength, value of assets – total or fixed,
turnover or sales, and different measures of profits.
15 Costs as a percentage of tax revenue should be treated with caution as tax revenue may
change with tax reform without there being any change in the compliance requirements
(Sandford and Hasseldine, 1996).
16 See Binh et. al. (2000) and Walpole et. al. (1999). For evidence of regressivity for the
United States, see Slemrod and Blumenthal (1996).
17 Evidence and analysis is in  Bardsley (1997) ,  Blumenthal and  Slemrod (1996), Mills
(1996), Slemrod and Blumenthal (1996), Slemrod and Venkatesh, (2002).14
Furthermore,  Blumenthal  and  Slemrod  (1996)  point to  a trade off
between simplicity and other objectives such as fairness and growth
facilitation.
18
Other sources of variation in compliance costs identified in the
literature include the nature of business activity, sector, region and
country and second, foreign operations of companies which have been
found to raise compliance costs in Canada and the United States.
19
In terms of sources, internal costs account for the bulk of costs.
Of these, personnel costs predominate. For example, of internal costs,
Slemrod and Blumenthal (1996) find for large US corporations, that 85
percent of costs were internal costs of which 55 percent were personnel
costs. Furthermore, of internal costs, 30 percent is due to departments
other than the tax department.
Regarding PAYE (Pay-as-you-earn or TDS), Australian and UK
estimates of employer’s PAYE are similar, at 2.6 percent of tax revenue.
Nevertheless cash flow benefits make net compliance costs much
smaller (Pope, Fayle, and Chen, 1993).
There is some support for a negative association between
voluntary or tax planning costs and tax revenue (Mills, 1996). This is not
necessarily the case, however, for mandatory costs.
International evidence of company compliance costs is
presented in Table 1.
20 As a percentage of tax revenue, estimates for the
corporation income tax range between 0.36 percent and 28 percent in
the table.
                                                       
18 Further discussion of simplification and tax complexity and additional references are in
Chattopadhyay and Das-Gupta (2002a).
19 See Blumenthal and Slemrod (1996), Erard (1995) , Erard (1997a), and (Slemrod and
Venkatesh, 2002).
20  Estimates of compliance costs are not strictly comparable due to very different tax
systems and serious differences in methods adopted. Further discussion is in
Chattopadhyay and Das-Gupta (2002a) and references cited there.15
II. Estimation of Compliance Costs:
Methodology
Basic Estimation
The basic relation between different compliance cost  estimates
is given by
Gross compliance costs  = Internal (personnel + other) costs + payments
to advisors + bribe costs
  = Legal compliance costs + bribe costs.
Estimates of major compliance cost components including
internal personnel and non-personnel costs as well as to external costs
are taken directly from questionnaire responses. For internal costs,
compliance expenditure classified by objects is also directly available as
are estimates for attribution of costs to different tax provisions and
administrative procedures.
A deficiency in the questionnaire that came to light after the fact
is the neglect of the cost of delayed tax refunds. Only aggregate
information on these costs are available from CAG (2002).
Consequently, compliance costs at the individual company level are
underestimated. The additional estimate reported at the aggregate level
is:
Adjusted legal compliance costs = Legal compliance costs + the
opportunity cost of delayed refunds.
Due to lack of information the preferred compliance cost concept which
could not be estimated is:
"True" gross compliance costs = Adjusted legal compliance costs + bribe
costs.
Mandatory and Voluntary Costs
Voluntary costs are taken to be costs associated with tax
planning and research, appeals filed by the company (though not
appeals filed against the company) and assistance with tax matters to
employees. In a second estimate, unallocated or "other" costs are added16
to this. Apportionment of other cost items was not attempted as being too
uncertain. For external costs, the classification into voluntary costs and
mandatory costs is directly available from questionnaires. Only
qualitative information is available for internal costs according to these
categories. The estimate reported here apportions internal costs in line
with their importance and that of external costs.
Cash Flow Benefits
Companies derive monetary benefits from interest savings or
earnings due to, first, the timing of advance tax instalments and, second,
the time interval between withholding of taxes for employees or non-
employees and deposit of withheld taxes in the government treasury. For
tax instalments, it is assumed that instalments correspond to legally laid
down percentages and that they are remitted on the due dates. For the
opportunity cost interest rate, it was seen that most Indian companies
are highly leveraged.
21 For a leveraged company, higher cash flow will
result in a reduced need to borrow resulting in interest cost saving at the
marginal borrowing rate of the company. So cash flow benefits are
valued at an assumed annual, short term, marginal borrowing interest
rate of 15 percent per year, compounded weekly, after discussion with
bank officials and a private sector company case study.
For TDS, there is a gap of 6 days for most companies between
monthly payment of salary and wages to employees and depositing
withheld taxes with the government. For non-employees, an average gap
of 15 days was suggested by the case study company. So companies
are assumed to derive cash-flow benefits equal to 6 or 15 days of
interest saving per month on the monthly amount of tax deducted at
source. So the following formula is used to estimate cash flow benefits
from TDS by companies:
Cash flow benefit from TDS = [TDS for employees][
365




                                                       
21 For example, the average debt equity ratio in 2000-01 of the 5599 companies for whom
this information is available in the CMIE's PROWESS data base was 3.23.17
For advance corporation tax, it is assumed that the benefit
accruing to companies is the interest saving it achieves compared to if it
were required to pay corporation tax on a weekly basis. 4 quarterly
advance tax instalments are payable on the 15th in the months June,
September, December and March of the financial year. The financial
year is from April 1 to March 31. The respective instalments are 15, 30,
30 and 25 percent of the estimated taxes due for the year, excluding any
taxes withheld by others on behalf of the company. The timing of these
payments makes it clear that taxes due are less than would be the case
if taxes were payable weekly, except during the last two weeks of
December and March. The formula used to estimate cash flow benefits
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In the equation above, X is the total corporation income tax due
from the company for the year net of tax deducted at source by other
entities. Due to the assumed rather than actual opportunity cost of funds
and the assumed rather than actual advance tax payments, this formula
only approximates cash flow benefits.
Net Compliance Costs and Social Compliance Costs
22
From legal compliance costs estimated directly from
questionnaires, actual or net compliance costs borne by companies is
worked out by taking account of tax deductibility of legal compliance cost
expenditures and cash flow benefits. Tax deductibility is assumed to
reduce   costs   at  the  surcharge  inclusive   corporation  tax rate of 38.5
                                                       
22 Some of the concepts in this section are discussed in Binh  et.  al. (2000), which has




Net compliance costs = Legal compliance costs [1-corporation tax rate]
+Bribe costs + Opportunity cost of delayed refunds – Cash flow benefits
For social compliance costs, the correct measure should value
the real resources expended on tax compliance, regardless of who bears
the costs. Bribes, being merely a transfer between different entities
should be netted out. Second, however, delayed refunds are available to
the government during the period of delay. The appropriate resource
cost valuation is, therefore, the difference between the government's
short term rate of return on borrowed funds, since the fiscal and revenue
deficits of the government in 2000-01 were positive, and the private rate
of return. The government's marginal cost of borrowing averaged 9.76
percent per annum in 26 auctions of 364 day treasury bills (Reserve
Bank of India, 2001). The resource value of delayed refunds is assumed
to be the difference between the assumed 15 percent rate of interest for
the private sector and 9.76 percent on an annualized, compound, basis.
So the following estimate is reported.
24
"Social" compliance costs = Legal compliance costs + Resource cost of
 delayed refunds.
                                                       
23 For companies whose marginal tax rate is determined by the Minimum Alternate Tax
(MAT), the surcharge inclusive marginal tax rate is 33%. This is taken into account.
Foreign companies taxed at a higher rate, were not present in the sample.
24 Resources could not be valued at their shadow values due to data limitations. Shadow
values will differ from market prices in  labour surplus economies like India's, with
additional differences arising from administered prices, protective tariffs, cascading
central excise and state sales taxes and other policy induced distortions. To do the
shadow valuation exercise, it is necessary to separate out wage and salary costs for
both internal costs and the labour component of external costs. Furthermore, non-labour
costs, internal and external, should be divided into the cost of traded goods, and non-
traded goods and services. Since  labour needed for tax compliance work is largely
scarce skilled  labour, the shadow wage rate is likely to exceed the market wage.
However, non-labour costs are likely to be overestimated relative to resource costs for
both traded goods (at border prices) and non-traded goods and services.19
Problems with Fixed Cost Apportionment and Other Taxes
Since the study aims to estimate the compliance costs of
companies only for the income tax (corporation tax and TDS), bias will
result if information furnished by companies is not attributable only to the
income tax. As discussed, important sources of possible bias are
apportionment of fixed costs and the value of time of company
management. However, the private sector company case study and
other anecdotal evidence suggests that bias due to inclusion of taxes
other than the corporation tax may be limited due to  organisational
separation of responsibilities for the corporation tax and other taxes in
major companies.
25
III. The Information Base for the Study
Information on compliance costs for this study was obtained from
a mailed survey supplemented by case studies and information on
sources of costs from pre-survey focus group meetings. To increase the
chance of unbiased responses to questions dealing with bribes and
illegal costs, the questionnaire was anonymous and not serially
numbered or otherwise identified, despite this making follow-up contact
with non-respondents impossible.
26 Nevertheless, only limited information
on bribes and legal costs was obtained.
27
                                                       
25 For a related finding see Blumenthal and Slemrod (1995).
26 Detailed discussion of the questionnaire and its construction is in Chattopadhyay and
Das-Gupta (2002).
27 Analysis of illegal costs is in  Chattopadhyay and  Das-Gupta (2002). Eight of 14
companies, or over 50 percent of companies expressing an opinion, felt that companies
in similar businesses paid bribes to income tax officials. The 70 percent "no comment"
rate suggests that the actual percentage could be higher. However, only two companies
providing estimates of cash bribes and these were small relative to sales or profits but
large relative to the legal income of tax officials. On the other hand, bribes reported as a
percentage of tax saved (by 3 companies) suggest substantial bribes and substantial
benefits from bribes.20
Among secondary sources, information from reports of the
Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG),
28 were used to (a) estimate the
cost of delayed refunds, (b) examine the extent and nature of
assessment errors by the Income-tax Department, and (c) arrive at an
estimate of the size of the universe for this study (consisting of
companies in the year 2000-01). The commercially available PROWESS
data base on Indian companies compiled by Centre for Monitoring the
Indian Economy
   (CMIE)
29 was used for estimates of aggregate
compliance costs of companies in India.
Distribution by Gross Income: Sample Versus Population
The available sample consists of 44 private sector companies.
30
This represents a disappointing 1.15% response rate of companies
sought to be surveyed (further information is in the Appendix). So an
assessment of the representativeness of the sample, however poor, is
crucial. Information on the distribution of 3,34,261 (public and private
sector) company  assessees in terms of  returned income or loss is
available in CAG (2002) for the year 2000-01, the year to which sample
data pertain, for four income groups, which combine both profitable and
loss making companies. A comparison between CAG and sample
income figures in Table 2 provides the some indication of the
representativeness of the sample.
Compared to the CAG distribution, the sample distribution has
an over-representation of large firms. Inferences from the sample for
smaller firms are likely to be less reliable than for large firms. Information
on the distribution of firms by turnover, book value of assets and profit or
loss is given in the Appendix.
Measures of Sample Size Relative to Population
CAG (2002) reports the Department of Company Affairs figure of
a population of 569,100 Indian companies in 2000-01. This reduces to
564,916 after subtracting 2918 non-profit associations registered under
                                                       
28  See Comptroller and Auditor General (2002) and Comptroller and Auditor General
(2002a).
29 See Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (2002).
30 The one public sector company which responded is included as a case study in
Chattopadhyay and Das-Gupta (2002)21
the Companies Act and 1266 public sector companies. However, not all
of these companies have productive, taxable, activity. CAG (2002)
reports only 3,34,261 company assessees on the tax rolls. Finally, if all
public sector firms are tax assessees, then the relevant private sector
population for this study is 332,995. This implies a study sample  of
between 13 and 14 per 100,000 companies.
By other indicators, the size of the sample is somewhat less
unsatisfactory. Compared to the CMIE sample, Table 3 shows that a
larger proportion of relevant financial aggregates is covered by the
sample in contrast to the small number of companies. Overall, therefore,
while the sample size is may be inadequate for reliable statistical
inference, especially for smaller firms measured by reported income,
sample statistics suggest that results are worth reporting if treated as
preliminary and viewed with caution.
Basic Characteristics of Sample Companies
Basic information about sample companies in terms of location,
size and age are in the Appendix. Sample biases suggested by the
information there are: a disproportionately large number of (a)
companies from  Mumbai; (b)  labour  intensitive companies; (c);
manufacturing companies; besides (d) as mentioned, large companies
with more than 1000 full time employees.  On the other hand: (a) no
hotels, restaurants or real estate service companies responded to the
survey; (b) loss making and zero profit companies are underrepresented.
Data on tax payments and effective tax rates are in Table 4.
Given that tax paid during the year is partly for previous years, some tax
rates in the table are above the surcharge inclusive corporation tax rate
for Indian companies of 38.5 percent in 2000-01.
31 The other notable
feature in  the  table is the high variability of tax as a percentage of profit
                                                       
31 Effective tax rates greater than 100% can arise, since companies were asked to report
taxes paid during not for the year. For companies subject to Minimum Alternate Tax on
the book value of assets, the effective surcharge inclusive marginal tax rate, for MAT in
excess of corporation tax paid, was 33 percent in 2000-01.22
before tax, as shown by the standard deviation.
32
The Choice of Scale Variables
Compliance costs in current rupees convey little information
about their burden. To facilitate inter-company and inter-country
comparison, in earlier studies compliance costs are reported as a
proportion of gross fixed assets, sales/turnover or employment. All three
are reported below. In addition, if compliance costs are interpreted as a
"hidden tax", the ratio of compliance costs to profit before tax (PBT)
provides the implicit "effective hidden tax rate" and allows the incidence
of compliance cost inclusive corporation taxes to be examined. A
problem in using PBT arises for loss making companies. Loss making
company ratios are reported separately. The fifth, vital, standard of
comparison is corporation tax paid. This is because corporation tax
compliance costs are a component of the cost of collecting these taxes.
However, here too a problem arises with negative taxes, tackled in the
same way below as for loss making firms.
In Figure 1, variations in (log) compliance costs with (the log of)
these five scale variables are graphed. The compliance cost variable is
legal compliance costs. As can be seen, PBT and employment are poor
predictors of compliance costs.
                                                       
32 In a linear regression of taxes paid on profit before tax or loss, the "marginal corporation
income tax rate" turns out to be 27.4 percent for sample companies (t-value = 16.6, R
square =0.893). This is below both the statutory corporation tax rate for Indian
companies and the surcharge inclusive MAT rate.33




















































































































































Aggregate estimates use the sample legal compliance cost to
turnover ratio and, alternatively, the legal compliance cost to book value
of assets ratio. Group means for different size groups are multiplied by
PROWESS group means for turnover or book value of assets. A
weighted average is then formed using PROWESS sample proportions.
Rupee figures are obtained by using tax data from PROWESS and the
ratio of tax paid by PROWESS companies to the government budget
figure for corporation tax collection in 2000-01 (Rs 357 billion). Besides
estimates based on group means, "high" and "low" estimates based on a
truncated 5 percent confidence intervals are also reported. A similar
exercise was carried out for net compliance costs. Social compliance
costs are estimated only at the aggregate level by adding the estimated
social cost of delayed refunds to legal compliance costs.
33
IV. Compliance Cost Estimates for Surveyed
Firms
Legal Compliance Costs
Gross legal compliance costs are in Tables 5 and 6 for profitable
and loss making firms separately. The large coefficients of variation,
even after excluding large valued outliers, show that no scale variable is
a reliable predictor of these costs.  While for some firms, costs are
extremely high by international standards, on average they are
reasonable except as a percentage of tax paid and per employee. The
former is more an indication of the comparatively porous Indian
corporation tax than the burden of compliance costs. Nevertheless, the
internationally high ratio to tax does indicate that the corporation tax is an
expensive source of government finance. The cost per employee, at
around 40 percent of India's per capita GDP in 2000-01, is clearly
unacceptable. Given the small sample size and high coefficients of
                                                       
33 Detailed discussion and tables relating to the aggregation methodology are in
Chattopadhyay and Das-Gupta (2002).25
variation, these conclusions should be taken as tentative and subject to
confirmation with a larger sample of companies.
Distribution of Compliance Costs by Company Size
Information on costs in relation to the five scale variables is in
the Appendix. Though coefficients of variation are still large, and though
trends are not monotonic, even after grouping observations, compliance
costs are broadly regressive by all indicators of firm size. In particular,
costs per employee and as a percentage of tax are unacceptably high for
smaller companies, suggesting that reforms to lower compliance costs
will help restore the competitiveness of smaller companies whose
competitiveness is clearly distorted by compliance requirements.
Findings from statistical analysis of the association of company
size with compliance costs are reported in Table 7.
34 Statistical analysis
confirms that legal compliance costs are regressive with respect to all
size variables, with  regressivity being particularly pronounced for the
income variable, profit before tax.
The Cost of Delayed Refunds
In the sample, 12 companies reported payment of excess taxes.
The reason given by the private sector case study company is due to tax
evasion penalty not being leviable under Indian law if taxes assessed
have already been paid.
35  Refunding of overpaid taxes involves long
delays by the Income-tax Department and the interest rate paid by the
government (8 percent simple interest per annum in 2000-01) is at a rate
below the opportunity cost of funds of most companies (assumed to be
15 percent per annum compounded weekly as explained in the previous
section). The opportunity cost of these blocked funds at current interest
                                                       
34 The goodness of fit was better for double-log regressions than for linear regressions with
comparable R squared statistics.
35 In the Allingham-Sandmo (1972) model, overpayment of taxes to avoid penalty can be an
expected income  maximising strategy, in the absence of refunds, if and only if tax
evasion is not expected income maximising. However, with uncertainty about the extent
of overpayment required to avoid penalty, quasi mandatory compliance costs in terms of
the net interest (or opportunity) cost of delayed refunds implies that both tax evasion and
overpayment of taxes can simultaneously be income maximising.26
rates, given the interest differential, works out to Rs 81.58 per year per
Rs 1,000 of refund due. The median value of refunds due was 46
percent of gross taxes or Rs 840,000 and ranged between 1.5 percent of
gross tax and 1160 percent of gross tax. The cost of delayed refunds is
clearly substantial, especially for companies near the average or above
it. However, no survey data are available on the duration of delay.
Benefits from Income Tax Compliance Requirements
Besides cash flow benefits from compliance requirements, there
are also qualitative benefits found in earlier studies. Though hard to
value, respondents opinions about these benefits are reported in Table
8. As the table shows, 62 percent of companies reported income
statement and balance sheets being better prepared due to compliance
requirements while over 50 percent found auditing requirements useful in
detecting dishonest employees. Surprisingly, only 23 percent of
companies felt that there were cash flow benefits.
Net Compliance Costs
Estimates of net compliance costs in Table 9 only net out cash
flow benefits from the timing of advance tax payments and the tax
deductibility of compliance expenditure. Adequate information on TDS
cash flow benefits and the cost of delayed refunds are not available.
Nevertheless, the estimates presented here are unexpected. Tax
deductibility and cash flow benefits reduce legal compliance costs by 86
percent.
36 In terms of their distribution, net compliance costs turn
negative for large firms measured by book value of assets or turnover
(see Das-Gupta and Chattopadhyay, 2002). This is similar to the pattern
of net compliance costs found in Australia.
Estimates of cash flow benefits from TDS are only available for 5
firms. If cash flow benefits from TDS are also taken into account net
compliance costs reduce further (Table 10), though the additional benefit
is relatively  small.
                                                       
36 Once again, averages are to be viewed cautiously given large coefficients of variation,
especially for net compliance costs as a percentage of legal compliance costs.27
No estimate of social compliance cost can be made for the
sample, as necessary information on delayed refunds is not available.
An Estimate of the Cost of Delayed Refunds Based on a
CAG Report
CAG (2002a) provides information on delays, in months, by the
Income-tax Department in granting refunds after the end of the relevant
assessment year according to different categories and by the state
where the company is assessed. The major category, contributing over
80 percent of delayed refund costs, is delay in the issue of refund
vouchers. Since no information is available on the time elapsing between
tax payment by the company and the end of the assessment year, this
cost element is perforce ignored. The  estimate also exclude quasi-
mandatory costs of risk insurance against penalties and possibly also a
part of mandatory costs, for example if a refund arises due to excess
taxes withheld by others. So estimates given here underestimate actual
costs. If it is (again conservatively) assumed that refunds arise due to tax
over-payment, the mandatory compliance cost element in delayed
refunds will be reflected in CAG data.
The formula used to value the cost of delayed refunds is W[1+ nr
– (1+rm)
n], where r is the rate of simple interest paid by the Income-tax
Department (8 percent per annum), rm is the opportunity cost interest rate
of the company (15 percent), n is the period of delay, and W is the
amount of refund in rupees. The number (or fraction) of years, n, is
calculated for each category in CAG data as a simple average of upper
and lower limits of the delay, measured in months, for different Indian
states. Results of this exercise are given in Table 11. To estimate the
social cost of delayed refunds a compound interest rate of 9.76 percent
for the government is taken instead of nr.
Aggregate Estimates
Aggregate estimates are reported in Table 12. The aggregate
estimates assume that costs of companies not in the PROWESS private
sector data set, including all public sector companies, are similar in terms
of the scale variables (turnover and gross fixed assets) as included
companies. This needs to be rectified in future research.28
The lowest estimates for different compliance cost measures and
the highest show wide variation. Furthermore, confirming their
preliminary nature, estimates using gross fixed assets and turnover have
only a small overlap.
In the table, legal compliance costs are between 4.33 and 13.18
percent of taxes paid. Adding the cost of delayed refunds, compliance
costs rise to between 6.44 and 15.29 percent of taxes. The upper
estimate is high by international standards, but, surprisingly, lower than
recent estimates for Australia and the United States reported in section
1.
On the other hand, while not all companies have negative net
compliance costs, estimates of net compliance costs in the table suggest
that, in aggregate, companies are able to recover legal compliance costs
despite the under-estimation of cash flow benefits. However bribe costs
not being reflected works in the opposite direction.
37 The addition of
delayed refund costs returns all estimates to positive territory.
Both social compliance costs and, after adding administrative
costs, gross operating costs, are around 0.5 percent below adjusted
legal costs.
The findings of this analysis of company compliance costs are
summarised in the concluding section.  The major conclusion is that
social costs are moderate by international standards at the lowest
estimates but high if the higher estimates are correct. Net private costs
can be reduced (on average) to zero, if the problem of delayed refunds is
tackled. To reduce compliance costs, administrative corruption must be
curbed and administration of refunds streamlined. The fragile nature of
these estimates, given the small sample size and high variation within
the sample are worth pointing out again.
                                                       
37 The cost of delayed refunds is largely an indirect outcome of corruption. The private
sector company case study and qualitative  information, suggest that delayed refunds
are only partly due to procedural hurdles and the need to window dress collections to
meet revenue targets. Reduction in delay can be achieved on payment of bribes at the
going rate of 10 percent in many cases. That bribes demanded are more costly than the
expected cost of waiting for refunds explains why many companies do not pay bribes to
expedite refunds.29
V. Compliance Cost Characteristics of Surveyed
Firms
A full scale statistical analysis of determinants of legal
compliance costs was attempted but is not reported since the limited
sample size, often further curtailed by missing observations, resulted in
high standard errors or omission of many variables of interest.
Nevertheless, one result worth reporting is that companies which claimed
harassment by the Income-tax Department had significantly higher
compliance costs than others, after controlling for other legal compliance
cost determinants.
Contribution to Internal Costs of Various Compliance
Activities
Company opinions on the importance of different compliance
activities are reported in Table 13. Additional information asked during
scrutiny assessment, followed by maintaining accounts are the major
contributory factors. The latter reflects differences in accounting
requirements for tax purposes and to satisfy disclosure requirements
under the Companies Act. The low importance of tax planning and
research and tax training accord with previous studies, but should be
treated with skepticism, given probable respondent bias.
Turning to objects of expenditure (Table 14), the small share of
expenses on employees does not accord with international experience,
but is plausible in a low wage economy like India's. The importance of
other items accords with expectations, though the high coefficients of
variation and minimum-maximum ranges should be noted.
Use of External Advisors
Table 15 shows that 70 percent of companies use outside tax
advisors to prepare returns, with small companies being somewhat more
dependent on external assistance. Tasks entrusted to tax advisors other
than return preparation form the bulk of work of tax advisors with fees30
paid to them for return preparation accounting for only a fifth of the total
(Table 16). Comparing Table 16 with Table 14, external costs are seen
to account for around 39 percent of the total legal costs of sample
companies. This is similar to the general pattern in most developed
countries. The average share of advisor fees amounts to 42 percent of
legal compliance costs  (Table 17), implying a skewed distribution with
smaller firms making greater relative use of external professional
services.
38 As expected, compulsory external financial audit is the main
source of fees of external professionals.
39 Other important sources of
income for advisors are litigation, particularly for cases by the company
and, unexpectedly, providing assistance to employees. Research and tax
planning, in contrast, is unimportant though, as with internal costs,
respondent bias cannot be ruled out.
Regarding the distribution of fees, Table 18 shows that fees paid
to advisors are only poorly predicted by company size, especially when
size is measured by number of employees rather than turnover.
However, in relation to turnover, the rate of increase in advisor's fees is
less than proportionate.
Finally, an important issue addressed in Table 19 is: "Why
should external expertise be relied on rather than developing in-house
expertise?" While the obvious and correct answer is the cost advantage
of doing so, the table seeks to ascertain what the sources of this cost
advantage could be.  The most important reason turns out to be tax
instability followed by tax ambiguity or complexity. Even administrative
obstacles are less important reasons for engaging tax advisors. Tax
planning, as before, is the least important reason for seeking
professional assistance.
                                                       
38  The average across companies is equivalent to a weighted average, with weights being
the shares of companies in total fees paid by all companies to advisors.
39  Only 31% of sample companies separately reported using external professionals for
compulsory audits with other respondents not providing the break up of external costs.
In fact, this should be 100%. On average 40% of costs were left  unallocated  by
respondents.31
Cost of Scrutiny and Appeals
That scrutiny costs are felt to be the most burdensome
component of internal costs has been reported above. Scrutiny
assessment and appeals are also important sources of external costs.
One reason for this is the long delay in completing scrutinies and the
large number of appeals filed. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
(second) appeals are mainly filed by the Income-tax Department, though
statistics on this are not available. Appeals are filed despite reportedly
low success rates of the department, so as to avoid sanctions for lack of
due diligence during external audit by the CAG, and consequent
"passing the buck". During 2000-01, there were 183,340 pending
company assessments out of a total workload of 481,702 assessments,
which is about 50 percent more than total company assessees. Of these,
30,301 were scrutiny assessments. While no break up is available by
company and non-company cases, 292,266 income tax appeals and
court cases were pending, or one for every hundred income taxpayers.
There were also 210,665 fraud and tax evasion penalty cases and
12,793 prosecution cases pending, Counting both convictions and
compoundings as successes, the success rate of the Department in
prosecution cases has averaged 31.2 percent during the past 5 financial
years. No data are available on the appeals success rate. Clearly, the
major outcome of disputes is compliance costs imposed on taxpayers
and even greater costs to society without much return in terms of
additional revenue.
In the sample, 23 of 37 responding companies (62 percent) were
scrutinised. This is a high rate internationally and also in comparison with
scrutiny of individuals. Table 20 is startling, and documents the 10 to 11
assessment years in dispute for tax or penalty for the average sample
company with a maximum of 20 years.
40 If the two to three years it takes
for completion of scrutiny assessments are added to this, the number of
                                                       
40  CAG (2002) does not provide separate details for the corporation and personal income
tax. For all assessees, the expected duration of cases in 2000-01 ws 37 months in the
ITAT, 42 months in high courts and 36 months in the Supreme Court. Weighting
expected durations by the proportion of cases at different levels (i.e. pending Supreme
Court cases for the current year, high court cases of 4 years ago and ITAT cases of 7
year ago), the expected duration of a tax dispute can be estimated at 58 months. This is
considerably less than information presented later for company cases suggests,
implying shorter expected durations for non-corporate cases.32
open assessment years of a typical company turns out to be 12 to 14.
This is unacceptable by any reasonable standards.
41
However, the link between pending assessment years and
compliance costs is not statistically robust in statistical exercises
reported in Table 21. Going by the most significant result in the table,
where the size variable is the profit before tax index, a one year increase
in the number of disputed assessment years, results in legal compliance
costs increasing by 5.68 percent.
42 Substantial reduction  in both legal
compliance costs and social operating costs appear possible if appeal
and case filing policies of the Income Tax Department are made cost
effective.
Mandatory and Voluntary Compliance Costs
Voluntary costs are taken to include costs of research and tax
planning, of appeals filed by the company and of providing assistance to
employees. Quasi-voluntary costs associated with procedures to obtain
concessions are excluded, since tax planning has already been
accounted for. For external costs, information on these expenditures is
available in rupees directly from the questionnaire. For internal costs,
only the importance of different costs on a five point scale is available in
Table 13. So these costs are estimated using reported scores and the
proportion of external costs.
43 Table 22 suggests that the bulk of costs
                                                       
41 The average times taken to close an assessment reported in a case study were as
follows:
Scrutiny assessment 30 months
Typical final assessment with rectifications 34 to 38 months
Typical final assessment with first appeal 34 to 46 months
Typical final assessment with second appeal 82 to 112 months
Typical final assessment with High Court reference 202 to 268 months
42 That is, using the average disputed years figure of 7.85+2.63 = 10.48 in Table 20,
     5.68  =  0.595/0.1048.
43  Scores by respondents of activities in Table 13 are used to compute proportionate
weights in total costs for each item.. Assuming that where external costs are important,
so too are internal costs,  if the external cost proportion for an item exceeds the internal
cost proportion, the internal proportion is adjusted up to the average of the external and
internal proportions (and then weights are readjusted to again add up to 100 percent).
The internal cost of an activity is taken to be proportional to these adjusted weights.33
are mandatory costs, despite possible upward bias in voluntary cost
estimates, with limited variation across firms. Even if all unallocated
expenditures are included, the voluntary cost percentage remains below
that of mandatory costs. The tentative conclusion is that voluntary costs
lie between 19.1 and 43.1 percent of total compliance costs. This
accords with information for other countries.
Cash Flow Benefits of TDS Obligations
No quantitative information is available on the cost of TDS
obligations, though information reported below suggests that they are
high on a gross basis. On a net basis, taking into account cash flow
benefits, some companies are able to recover much of their outlay.
Details for 5 companies, in Table 23, show, however, that there is wide
variation in the extent of cash flow benefits.
On average, these benefits amount to 14.5 percent of total legal
compliance costs or one third of a percent of tax paid.
Main Conclusions
The major points emerging in this chapter relate to the
importance of administrative delays, scrutiny procedures and litigation as
sources of compliance costs. These are all well known as problem areas
for tax administration. So the oft made point on the need for streamlining
of administrative procedures finds additional support here. Other major
findings are the importance of tax instability and complexity for seeking
external assistance and the lack of importance of tax planning to
compliance costs.34
VI. High Compliance Cost Requirements:    "Hot
Spots"
Information from the Survey and Focus Group Meetings
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Respondent opinions (Table 24) and cost estimates (Table 25)
for tax provisions identified as "hot spots" or high compliance cost areas
by companies are now reported. Tables 26 and 27 report similar
information for administrative procedures. The relatively low variability of
responses, as measured by the coefficient of variation (except for
refunds in Table 27), is striking and contrasts with many other findings in
this paper.
As expected, TDS and compulsory audits, figure at the top. The
most troubling finding is that compliance costs for claiming export
benefits are rated near the top of Table 25 and also receive a relatively
high score in Table 24. This suggests that  a these concessions are
eroded by compliance costs, reducing their effect on export promotion.
The high compliance cost of the MAT confirms results in another study.
45
The other surprise is costs in connection with free trade zones
which focus group participants also verified to be of importance. These
costs, associated with the need to get repeated clearances, again
hampers export growth. Related "hot spots" are compliance with non-
resident withholding and newly amended international tax provisions.
Alternatives that can be explored to lower compliance costs are better
taxpayer education and assistance, for example through improved
advance ruling procedures and broadening their scope.
Among administrative "hot spots", refunds, scrutiny assessment,
TDS and litigation are, by now, recurrent themes. In Table 28 which
summarises responses to open ended questions, however, two other
important areas also come to light: Lack of accountability and
                                                       
44 Section numbers here reflect sections of the (Indian) Income-tax Act, 1961.
45 The Alternate Minimum Tax (AMT) in the United States caused compliance costs to rise
by 11.5% for those subject to AMT but increased compliance costs by as much as 136%
for companies not subject to AMT (Slemrod and Venkatesh, 2002).35
transparency in tax administration matters and non-transparent and
ambiguous terminology of tax laws.  Lack of accountability and the ill
effects of administrative discretion have been pointed out by others over
the years, without any impact to date on administrative functioning. So
too has the need for clear legal drafting.
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Comments on Causes of High Compliance Costs in Focus
Group Meetings
These comments, which serve to flesh out the bare bones
provided by numbers, made by individuals with long experience "in the
trenches", are of great interest. Specific suggestions made by
participants are underlined.
General Comments
(a)  A basic malady today of the tax system was the lack of accountability
 of officials and their unhelpful attitude.
(b)  Technical lapses arise due to new procedures not being pre-tested.
One example is automatic additional tax for technical defaults under
the now repealed section 43(1A).
(c)  An important source of compliance costs is new or unforeseen
income tax notifications. In addition, Revenue  Department
interpretations of new notifications often differed from taxpayers'
interpretations leading to court disputes.
(d) Tax simplification by removing exemptions and deductions would
help to lower compliance costs.
On problems with Assessment Procedures and Assessing
Officers
(e)  In many cases the Income-tax Department itself breaks the law.
(f)  Assessing officers' (AOs') fear of targets lead to increased
compliance costs of taxpayers via "high pitched assessments".
                                                       
46 As pointed out earlier, "psychic costs" of the policy environment are  analysed in
Chattopadhyay and Das-Gupta (2002).36
(g)  Multinational companies have to bring vouchers from their head
offices [abroad] on a day-to-day basis for income tax assessment,
greatly adding to compliance costs.
(h)  Recent transfer pricing provisions are likely to give more
discretionary power to AOs.
On Advisors and External Costs
(i)  A large proportion of advisors fees go to cover "idle time" spent
waiting for appointments, meetings and hearings, often on chairs or
benches outside the rooms of concerned income tax officials.
(j)  A major reason for taxpayers using professional advisors was for
representation before tax authorities.
(k)  Tax consultants continue to be used despite "simplification" because
nothing changed in the field after high level reforms.
On Tax Deduction at Source
The TDS compliance burden of companies is high. Companies
are not averse to helping revenue collection by deducting taxes from
those who otherwise might not have paid – but they were upset by this
resulting in criminal liability in case of technical lapses, especially if these
lapses were only in the tax department’s mind.
To elaborate:
(l)  Companies had to go through two assessments, one for income tax
and one for TDS.
(m) Great uncertainty resulted from the fact that no time limit on TDS
assessments exists unlike income tax audits where there is a 5 year
limit on reopening assessments. So, TDS assessment records have
to be maintained for at least 10 years.
(n)  TDS penalties were often levied on withholders though the fault lay
with withholdees.
(o)  There were 10,000 to 15,000 cases in 1998-99 of penalties under
Section 201 [making the principal officer of a company liable for TDS
defaults] read with Section 221 [on TDS penalties], most of these
being unsustainable.37
(p)  Prosecutions were often launched after misinterpretation of the law
by  AOs. Approval of prosecutions often followed the transfer of
senior officers aware of the facts.
(q)  For prosecutions, all directors of companies were defendants
(usually granted bail) who had to be present at sessions court
hearings. Non-appearance could lead to non-bailable warrants of
arrest.
(r)  Sessions judges were usually untrained in tax matters and often
referred prosecution cases back to tax authorities leading to delays.
Some TDS cases were over 20 years old.
(s)  For payments to non-residents under section 195, the rate of TDS
was determined case-by-case by assessing officers. To reduce
discretion and compliance costs a prescribed uniform rate was
needed.
(t)  The scheme for rationalisation of TDS proposed in an article in the
Economic Times,  18 February, 2001, was good in principle and
should be seriously considered.
(u)  Firms should be compensated for the tax collection service they
provided to the government.
On Costs of  Clearances and Permissions
(v)  Obtaining various clearances and prior approvals from income tax
authorities and also following up on letters and petitions contributed
greatly to compliance costs.
(w) Clearances for immovable property sales under section 230A were a
major problem.
(x)  Penal provisions for IT Department  staff in case of delays in
clearances were needed.
On High Compliance Cost Income Tax Provisions and
Notifications
(y)  Conflicts with other legislation (such as the Companies Act) included
differences in accounting requirements and depreciation provisions
increasing business costs.
(z)  Procedures connected with amalgamation, merger or de-merger of
companies led to considerable compliance costs
(aa)  .For companies setting up units in free trade zones, the compliance
requirements of section 10A and 10B [for newly established38
undertaking in free trade zones or for exports] led to tax planning
costs. In some cases these costs have deterred companies from
setting up units in these zones. This hurts exports.
(ab)Problems with section 44AB (compulsory financial audit) receive little
attention from the authorities.
(ac)It is difficult for employers to open provident fund accounts for
employees because relevant income tax rules are quite different
from the provident fund rules. Why different rules by two arms of the
government for the same purpose are needed was not clear.
On Appeals and Litigation
(ad)Up to 90 percent of cases in which assessing officers  make
additions end up in appeal.
(ae)Time delays in appeals were exacerbated by an inadequate number
 of benches though additional benches had recently been sanctioned.
(af)The success rates of the Department in appeals and prosecutions
was very low. The major outcome of appeals was higher compliance
costs.
(ag) Appeals by the IT Department, even when they did not have a
proper case, was sometimes because decisions were made by ITAT
counsels themselves – who stood to gain from them.
(ah) One reason for the growth in appeals cases was cases between the
tax authorities and government companies. These could be settled
outside the court system instead of wasting taxpayers’ money.
(ai) Refund of appeal fees in case of dismissed appeals should be made
mandatory.
On Delayed Refunds
(aj) Non-refund of excess tax paid but adjustment of refunds due against
   future taxes was the norm.
(ak)Many man-hours were wasted in collecting refunds.
(al) Lower level officers were over-enthusiastic about meeting revenue
 targets and did not pay sufficient attention to refunds.
(am) Penal provisions for IT Department staff in case of delays in refunds
should be instituted.39
VII. Conclusions and Suggestions
Conclusions
Limitations of the sample, questionnaire design and statistical
estimates have been carefully pointed out above whenever they arose.
Overall, while the sample size is clearly inadequate for reliable statistical
inference, especially for smaller firms, results appear to be worth
reporting if results are treated as preliminary and viewed with caution,
given that this is a pioneering attempt to measure company income tax
compliance costs in India. The major conclusions with regard to
company compliance costs and the operating cost of the corporation tax
are now summarised.40
Summary of Findings on the Income Tax Compliance Cost of Indian Companies (2000-01)
Compliance Cost Measure Sample Findings Projection for All Indian
Companies
Legal compliance costs (LCC) =
Internal (personnel + other) costs
+ payments to advisors
Highly  variable but unacceptably high
for some firms. Averages: Rs 6475 per
employee, 4.12% of profit before tax,
30.41% of tax paid
Between 4.33% and 13.18% of
tax paid
Distribution of LCC by company
size
By and large, regressive for all
measures of company size
No information
Gross compliance costs: LCC +
bribe costs.
Not estimated No information
Adjusted LCC = LCC +
opportunity cost of delayed
refunds.
Median refunds due to overpayment of
taxes to avoid penalty average 46% of
taxes.
Between 6.44% and 15.29% of
tax paid. Delayed refund costs
2.11% of tax paid
Cash flow benefits from advance
tax and TDS
Over 50% of legal compliance costs Not directly estimated
Net compliance costs = Adjusted
LCC – cash flow benefits from
advance tax and TDS – tax
deduction of compliance
expenditure
Average: 15% of legal compliance
costs. Negative for most large firms.
Between minus 0.72% and plus
0.62% of tax paid before delayed
refund costs
"Social" compliance costs = LCC
+ social opportunity cost of
delayed refunds
Not estimated Between 5.61% and 14.46% of
tax paid. Delayed refund social
cost: 1.28% of tax paid
"Social" operating costs  =
"Social" compliance costs +
administrative expenditure
Not applicable Between 5.92% and 14.77% of
tax paidOther important conclusions about compliance costs are:
•  While some firms have extremely high compliance costs, on average
they are reasonable by international standards.
•  Relatively high legal compliance costs as a percentage taxes are
more an indication of the porous Indian  corporation tax than the
burden of compliance costs. Nevertheless, the corporation tax is an
expensive source of government finance.
•  Estimates of net compliance costs suggest that, in aggregate,
companies are able to recover legal compliance costs, though this is
not the case for small companies.
•  Social costs are moderate by international standards at the lowest
estimate but high if the higher estimate is closer to the real situation.
•  Many companies find income statements and balance sheets better
prepared due to compliance requirements and auditing requirements
are found useful in detecting dishonest employees.
•  Legal compliance costs are regressive with respect to all size
indicators  examined.
•  Twelve sample companies reported payment of excess taxes since
tax evasion penalty is not leviable under Indian law if taxes assessed
have already been paid. At the median, overpayment amounted to
46 percent of taxes paid.
Other findings about compliance requirements of companies and
compliance cost components are:
•  Additional information asked during scrutiny assessment followed by
maintaining accounts are the major activities contributing to
compliance costs. For the latter, differences in accounting
requirements for tax purposes and under the Companies Act are of
importance.
•  Seventy percent of companies use outside tax advisors to prepare
returns, with small companies being somewhat more dependent on
external assistance.
•  External costs account for around 39 percent of the total legal costs
of sample companies.
•  Compulsory external financial audit is the main source of fees of
external professionals. A second important sources is litigation.
•  The most important reason for use of professional advisors is tax
structure instability due to frequent changes in tax laws followed by
ambiguity and complexity of tax laws.•  Of legal compliance costs, the bulk consists of mandatory costs, with
voluntary costs being estimated to be between 19 and 43 percent of
legal costs.
•  The average sample company had 10 to 11 assessment years
locked in disputes for tax or penalty with a maximum of 20 years.
Given two to three years for scrutiny assessments, the number of
open assessment years of a typical company is 12 to 14.
•  Statistical analysis suggests that a one year increase in the number
of disputed assessment years, raises legal compliance costs by 5.68
percent.
•  Sample information points to over 50 percent of Indian companies
paying bribes to income tax officials
Reform Suggestions
General suggestions are first made followed by a list of high
compliance cost legal provisions and administrative procedures for which
streamlining by the Income-tax Department is suggested.
General suggestions
•  Private compliance costs, on a net basis can be reduced, on
average, to zero, if the problem of delayed refunds is tackled by
streamlining refund procedures and reducing the time lag.
Administrative corruption in this area should also be tackled.
•  Improving taxpayer services for business appears to offer scope for
reducing compliance costs of high cost provisions.
•  To reduce compliance costs, reducing the discretionary powers of
income tax officials, increasing their individual accountability and
reducing direct contact with taxpayers where possible are important.
•  Among specific areas, alleged bribe taking by appellate authorities to
give favourable judgments could be guarded against, by regular after
the fact reviews of a sample of appeal cases.
•  Costs of the policy environment, tax laws and frequent administrative
notifications are high and require reduction.
•  To reduce costs of complexity and ambiguity, tax law simplification,
including improved legal drafting, is indicated.
•  Strengthening advance rulings and extending their scope can also
reduce costs of tax ambiguity and complexity.•  Efforts to  harmonise central and state tax provisions, such as
regarding notified backward districts, can also lower compliance
costs.
•  There are five areas related to international transactions that are
troublesome (identified below). These areas will become increasingly
important as global links of Indian companies grow.
Reform of Specific Provisions
Legal and procedural "hot spots" which add to compliance costs
are listed below. Besides detailed examination by the Income-tax
Department and simplification where possible, improving taxpayer
services for business appears to offer the best scope for reducing
compliance costs of these provisions. However, with regard to
concessions, the large tax benefits companies derive from them suggest
that tax simplification by scrapping concessions, especially where the
extent of the concession is not justified by commensurate achievement
of social objectives, is an additional option for lowering compliance
costs.
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Legal hot spots include:
•  Compulsory financial audit
•  Claiming export concessions, with particular reference to rules,
clearances and procedures
•  Non-resident withholding
•  Permissions in connection with free trade zones
•  International tax provisions
•  The Minimum Alternate Tax
•  Valuation of perquisites
•  Provisions related to company restructuring
•  Discretion of assessing officers in applying newly introduced transfer
pricing regulations
•  TDS penalties for withholders and the absence of a time limit for
TDS assessment
                                                       
47 Reform of procedures as well as tax simplification have both been suggested by the
Kelkar Committee. See Government of India, Ministry of Finance and Company Affairs
(2002).•  Absence of penalties for tax department staff especially concerning
delayed refunds and clearances.
Regarding administrative procedures, hot spots identified include:
•  Refund procedures and monitoring
•  Appeal filing and disposal especially due to the lack of a policy to
ensure cost effectiveness and increase the department's success
ratio.
•  Inadequate tax related expertise of appeals tribunals
•  The absence of realistic revenue targets for assessing officers
•  The limited accountability of assessing officers. This can be
improved by tracking past assessment performance of individual
assessing officers. In turn, computerisation of personnel records,
including assessment work done by officers, will help.
•  Inadequacies in the scheduling of assessment hearings, keeping in
vie the convenience of taxpayers, resulting in excessive waiting time
of assessees or their representatives.
•  The slow speed of scrutiny procedures and separation of TDS and
corporation tax scrutinies
•  Excessive discretion of assessing officers, for example in setting
rates for tax deduction at source under section 194J. One measure
to reduce this is by preparing a scrutiny manual which currently does
not exist.
•  Inadequate training of assessing officers in selected areas identified
by audit objections. This can be rectified by focused training,
designed after necessary internal inquiry to ascertain the causes of
lapses.
•  Procedures for grant of tax clearance certificates (Form 34A) under
section 230A.Table 1: Recent Evidence of Tax Compliance Costs of Corporations
(percentages of tax revenue of relevant tax)

























Fed. Rep. of Germany








7 c. 1994 4.0
New Zealand
8 1989-90 1.3 6.3 3.9 0.8
Norway
9 1987 8.8 7.0
Sweden
10 1993 (1.7
7) 0.34 2.6 0.65
UK





RANGE --- 0.36-28.0 0.34-1.9 2.6-8.0 --- ---
Notes and Sources:
1. Evans et. al. (1997) reported in Binh (2000). Estimates are for business taxpayers and "Corporation tax " actually income
tax on businesses. S: Social compliance costs.  Private compliance costs are negative for large businesses.
2. (a) Plamondon and Zussman (1996). An opinion survey of compliance costs of small and medium business is reported in
Erard (1997a).
3. Tauber (1983) and Tiebel (1984).
4. Harris (1989).
5. Freidkes and Gavish (1989).
6. Ariff et. Al. (1995).
7. Allers (1995). Imhof and Snijder (1981) (cited in Imhof ,1989) provide 1980 cash estimates of per form costs.
8. Sandford and Hasseldine (1992) .
9. Nicolaissen (1989).10. Malmer (1994) and Malmer (1995). "Corporation tax" is actually income tax, including for individuals.
11. Hudson and Godwin (2000), Collard and Godwin (1999). Cash flow benefits exceeded compliance costs for firms with
over 1000 employees.
12. USA: Slemrod and Venkatesh (2002) for small and medium businesses. Blumenthal and Slemrod (1992) for large
businesses.


























0-50   59  20 -39   59  20 -39
50-500  17   5 -12   76  25 -51
500-1000  12   5 -7   88  30 -58
>1000  12  70 58 100 100     0
Total 100 100  0 100 100    0Table 3: Indicators of Sample Size
Indicator Sample Total (In 10s
 of million rupees)
Sample as a % of
Aggregate
Book Value of Assets
@ 31,378 5.02*
Sales/Turnover 26,234 3.37*
Profit Before Tax 3,774 14.99*
Corporation Tax Paid 2.64** 7.15*
,#




 (% of total)
CMIE as a % of total corporation tax in 2000-
01**
56.1 43.9 84.21
Notes: @: Instead of  Book Value of Assets, the closest CMIE variable available is Gross Fixed Assets (GFA).
            *  CMIE Sample of 6634 private sector companies.
          **: Accounts figures for (gross) corporation income tax are from the Union Budget (2002).
    Table 4: Tax Payments by Sample Companies
Average Minimum Maximum Stand dev. No. of
observations
All Taxes Paid (Rs. Million)
Tax Paid 1507.86 0.002 25000.0 4942.33 27
As a % of Profit Before Tax
 (Profitable firms only)* 137.3 2.9 671.9 158.7 23
Corporation Income Tax Paid (Rs. million)
Tax Paid 509.46 0.007 8227.25 1558.79 35
Effective Tax Rate (%)
(Profitable firms only) 45.7 1.1 190.0 51.3 30
Notes: Effective tax rate: Taxes as a percent of profit before tax.
           *Excludes two outliers: 118182.8 and 3165.17.Table 5: Estimates of Legal Compliance Costs of Profit Making Units
% of
turnover





% of tax % of book value
of assets
Average 0.35 6475 4.12 30.41 1.30
Minimum 0.003 47 0.025 0.11 0.00
Maximum 2.07 39616 30.00 392.47 7.76
Standard Deviation 0.53 10278 6.33 71.58 2.07
Coefficien`t of Variation 1.53 2.00 1.54 2.35 1.59
No of observations 32 30 29 32 31
Note: The table excludes the following outliers (i.e. lying outside average– 3 standard deviations).
           (a) % of turnover: 7.72.
           (b) Per full time & part time employee: 95,345.
           (c) % of profit before tax: 1363.64. A zero profit company is also excluded.
           (d) % of tax: 1136.39.
           (e) % of book value of assets: 17.99 and 10.66.Table 6: Estimates of Legal Compliance Costs of Loss Making Units
% of
turnover
Per full time &
part time employee
(Rupees)
% of loss % of book value
of assets
Average 0.21   6501 1.71 1.43
Minimum 0.01      130 0.17 0.04
Maximum 0.55 26500 4.53 5.19
Standard Deviation 0.21 11256 1.77 2.51
Coefficient of Variation 1.00 1.73 1.03 1.76
No of observations 5 5 5 5
Notes: (1) The table excludes the following outliers (i.e. lying outside average– 3 standard deviations).
                 (a)  Per full time & part time employee: 216,667.
                 (b) % of profit before tax: 11.60.
                 (c) % of book value of assets: 43.33.
            (2) Total compliance costs as a % of tax are not reported because of both positive and negative
                  taxes and high variability.Table 7: Legal Compliance Costs and Company Size
(Double-Log regressions on Scaled Legal Compliance Costs in Rupees)




Elasticity R squared Observ-
ations
Turnover (in Rs) 1.98***  0.441*** 0.441 0.480 37
Book Value of Assets (in Rs) 2.64***  0.394*** 0.394 0.441 36
Employment (in numbers) 0.497***    0.258** 0.258 0.404 34
Profit Before Tax/Loss Index # -0.980***    0.303* 0.139 0.446 21
Net Tax Paid Index# -0.688***  0.355*** 0.285 0.147 37
Notes:   (1) *: Significant at 10%; **: Significant at 5%, ***: Significant at 1%.
             (2) @: Coefficients are multiplied by 1000 excepting for employment.
              (3) Regressions also included the number of assessment years still open, if the variable proved
                   significant at least at 10%.
             (4) Results for the number of assessment years still open are reported below.
             (5) #: Given negative values of these variables, a linear transformation given by





1 . 0 x
-
-
+ =  was used. Elasticities are for the basic – not transformed – variable.





(A)  as a %
of (B)
Company's income statement and balance sheets
 Are better prepared
28 45 62
Better detection of employee malfeasance
(due to requirements under Section 44AB)
23 45 51
Cash flow benefits 10 43 23
Note: Other advantages include improved asset management (39%), inventory control (45%), stock valuation (46%),
better receivables control (33%) and “others” (57%).Table 9: Net Compliance Costs (NCC) after Tax Deduction of Compliance Expenditure and
Cash Flow Benefits from Timing of Advance Tax Payments
Cash flow benefits
as a % of legal
compliance costs
@
NCC: % of legal
compliance costs
@





Average 85.55 14.45 2.09 23.76
Minimum 33.00 -329.03 -1.53 -1.72
Maximum 429.03 67.00 18.45 269.37
Coefficient of variation 1.12 6.61 1.95 2.28
Number of positive observations 39 30 18 24
Total Number of observations 39 39 29 35
Notes: @: Excludes two outliers with % of legal compliance costs of -1178.61 and –836.60.
             $: Excludes one outlier: -838.64.
            *: Excludes one outlier: 697.28.














% of Profit Before Tax 0.66 1.14 0.34 1.62 0.24 0.80 0.72
% of Tax Paid 2.03 3.58 0.77 6.14 0.48 2.60 0.89
Net Compliance Costs after Cash Flow Benefits of Advance Tax and Tax Deductibility
% of Legal Compliance
Costs
-17.08 -41.93 -144.35 9.29 -193.61 -77.54 -1.12
% of Profit Before Tax -0.11 -0.48 -0.49 0.15 -0.47 -0.28 -1.03
% of Tax Paid -0.35 -0.45 -1.08 0.33 -0.94 -0.50 -1.12
Net Compliance Costs after Cash Flow Benefits of Advance Tax, Tax Deductibility and TDS
% of Legal Compliance
Costs
-18.48 -75.48 -162.55 5.62 -209.14 -92.01 -1.00
% of Profit Before Tax -0.12 -0.86 -0.56 0.09 -0.51 -0.39 -0.96
% of Tax Paid -0.37 -1.65 -1.22 0.10 -1.01 -0.83 -0.84Table 11: Estimated Costs to Companies of Delayed Refunds in 2000-01
Item                            Cost
Estimated delay costs  (Rs Million) 7531.8
Corporation tax revenue in 2000-01  (Rs Million) 356960
Delayed refund cost as a % of corporation tax revenue in 2000-01 2.11
Memo
Delayed refunds where costs could not be estimated
(Amount refunded in Rs Million)  670.8
Basic data source: CAG (2002a).
Table 12: Aggregate Estimates of the Compliance Costs of Companies
Estimate for PROWESS companies Projection for all Indian companies
Low Middle High Low Middle High
Legal Compliance Costs
Estimates Based on the Proportion of Gross Fixed Assets (GFA)
Tens of Million Rupees 1061 1387 1738 2872 3755 4704
% of GFA 0.17 0.22 0.28
% of Turnover 0.14 0.18 0.22
% of Profit Before Tax 4.21 5.51 6.90
% of Corporation Tax 8.05 10.52 13.18 8.05 10.52 13.18
Cont’d…
Estimates Based on the Proportion of Total Sales/Turnover
Tens of Million Rupees 571 737 908 1546 1994 2458
% of GFA 0.09 0.12 0.15
% of Turnover 0.07 0.09 0.12
% of Profit Before Tax 2.27 2.93 3.61
% of Corporation Tax 4.33 5.59 6.89 4.33 5.59 6.89
Private Cost of delayed refunds (% of tax) 2.11 2.11 2.11
Adjusted Legal Compliance Costs Projected by GFA 10.16 12.63 15.29
Adjusted Legal Compliance Costs Projected by Turnover    6.44    7.70   9.00
Net Compliance Costs (Excluding TDS Cash Flow Benefits)
Estimates Based on the Proportion of Gross Fixed Assets (GFA)Table 12: Aggregate Estimates of the Compliance Costs of Companies
Estimate for PROWESS companies Projection for all Indian companies
Low Middle High Low Middle High
Tens of Million Rupees -35.7 14.2 82.4 -97 38 223
% of GFA -0.006 0.002 0.013
% of Turnover -0.005 0.002 0.011
% of Profit Before Tax -0.142 0.056 0.327
% of Corporation Tax -0.27 0.11 0.62 -0.27 0.11 0.62
Estimates Based on the Proportion of Total Sales/Turnover
Tens of Million Rupees -94.6 -20.5 63.0 -256 -55 170
% of GFA -0.015 -0.003 0.010
% of Turnover -0.012 -0.003 0.008
% of Profit Before Tax -0.376 -0.081 0.250
% of Corporation Tax -0.718 -0.155 0.478 -0.72 -0.16 0.48
Private Cost of delayed refunds (% of tax) 2.11 2.11 2.11
Adjusted Net Compliance Costs Projected by GFA 1.84 2.22 2.73
Adjusted Net Compliance Costs Projected by Turnover 1.39 1.95 2.59
"Social" Compliance Costs
Social cost of delayed refunds (% of tax) 1.28 1.28 1.28
"Social" Compliance Costs Projected by GFA 9.32 11.80 14.46
"Social" Compliance Costs Projected by Turnover 5.61   6.87   8.16
"Social" Operating Costs
Administrative Costs of the Income-tax Department
(2) 0.31 0.31 0.31
Social Operating Costs Projected by GFA 9.63 12.11 14.77
Social Operating Costs Projected by Turnover 5.92   7.18   8.48
Notes: (1) Estimated TDS costs are 5.68% of the non-corporate income tax or Rs 18 billion in Chattopadhyay
                  and Das-Gupta (2002). Though partly borne by corporations they are not included because of lack
                  of information.
              (2): The Ministry of Finance figure for revenue expenditure of the income tax department is Rs  8.7
                    billion for 2000-01. Following apportionment of costs between taxes by the CAG for 1999-2000,
                   12.7% percent  or Rs 1.11 billion is taken as the share of costs of the corporate income tax. The CAG
                   (2000) figure, which excludes “Direction and  Administration”, is Rs 1.07 billion.Table 13: Rating by Sample Companies of Selected Activities Contributing to Internal Costs



















Information asked for during
scrutiny assessment 22 14 2 0 1 0 3.44
Maintaining account books 15 3 3 0 1 0 3.41
Completing and Submitting tax
returns 21 11 6 0 0 0 3.39
Completing and Submitting
TDS returns 21 10 5 1 1 0 3.29
To obtain a tax refund 15 17 6 0 0 1 3.24
Research and tax planning 4 6 13 1 4 1 2.18
Tax related training for
employees 0 9 15 5 9 0 1.63
Providing assistance to
employees 5 5 8 9 10 0 1.62
Table 14: Internal Compliance Costs by Object of Expenditure (Rs '000)
Average
%




On employee salaries, etc. 24.7   656   10 5,000 1.65 36
Office space/services at market
rental value 11.8  313   1 2,400 1.93 34
Computers and data processing 9.9   262    1 5,000 3.33 37
Accounts/record preparation,
storage, etc. 8.0  214    1 4,000 3.24 37Table 14: Internal Compliance Costs by Object of Expenditure (Rs '000)
Average
%




Additional costs to claim tax
concessions 1.5     41    2   150 1.80 34
All Internal Costs 100.0 1314    7 22,200 2.41 38
Note: Other cost items include travel and conveyance (5.3%), general supplies and stationery (3.2%),
           Photocopying, fax and postal expenses (2.5%), purchase of tax publications (0.8%) and “others” (32.3%).
           Row averages do not add up to the "all internal costs" figure due to missing observations. Figures in the
           "average %" column add up to 100% and are based on figures in the average column.
Table 15: Tax Return Prepared In-house or By Company:
Cumulative Distribution By Size of Company
Companies classified by number of employees
Number of employees Below 20 21 to100 101 to 500 501 to 1000 Above 1001
In house 0 0 1 2 10
Paid Advisor 7 15 21 25 28
Companies classified by turnover
Turnover Below Rs. 20
million




Rs 1 to 5 billion Over Rs 5 billion
In house 0 1 1 5 11
Paid Advisor 6 17 24 28 29Table 16: Fees Paid to Tax Advisors*
For completing tax return For all income tax related work #
Average Fee Paid (Rs.) 157,322 830,720
Maximum (Rs.) 1,000,000 13,705,000
Minimum (Rs.) 500 4,000
Coefficient of variation 1.43 2.58
% of companies using advisors 69 100
No. of  observations 29          42
Note: *Advisor: chartered accountants, lawyers and other tax professionals engaged and paid by the
           company.
         #: On a regular basis or occasionally for tax or legal advice.
Table 17: Activities for which Tax Advisors Are Used
(in Descending Order of Importance)
% of advisor
fees External cost % for companies using advisors for the activity




For  compulsory financial audit under
section 44AB
21.80 33.08 4.32 100.00 0.98 30.95
Maintaining account books 19.59 32.66 12.50 50.00 0.59 9.52
Litigation initiated by the company 8.59 19.90 0.73 45.65 0.61 42.86
Litigation initiated by the IT Department 6.27 14.10 1.00 28.30 0.63 35.71
For scrutiny assessment 4.82 22.75 5.49 56.78 0.73 38.10
Providing assistance to employees 4.02 12.79 2.00 44.44 1.12 16.67
To obtain a tax refund 1.49 13.63 1.43 39.02 0.82 28.57
Research and tax planning (RP) 0.52 6.35 0.36 22.73 1.19 26.19
% of legal compliance costs 38.74 42.47 0.40 95.69 0.65 100.00Table 18: Distribution By Company Size of Fees Paid to
Tax Advisors for Income Tax Related Work (in Rupees)
Companies classified by number of employees
No. of Employees Below 20 21 to100 101 to 500 501 to 1000 Above 1001
Average 230,715 160,938 196,071 767,725 1,197,555
Standard Deviation 235,257 224,861 219,145 942,405 2,116,510
No. of Observations 5 8 7 5
Companies classified by turnover




Rs 1 to 5 billion Over Rs 5 billion
Average 184,940 200,955 510,714 611,944 1,516,667
Standard Deviation 239,624 254,109 736,594 517,490 2,759,815
No. of Observations 5 11 7 8





















Frequent changes of laws 22 14 4 0 1 1 3.37 42
For perfect tax calculation 26 9 3 0 3 0 3.34 41
Complex tax affairs to deal with 6 15 11 2 6 1 2.33 41
Limited in-house expertise 8 10 11 3 6 3 2.29 41
Lack of assurance about help
from tax officials 10 7 14 3 5 2 2.36
41
To reduce tax burden 5 12 13 2 8 1 2.10 41










For tax 2.35 1 8 1.70 0.72 23 Commissioner
(Appeals) For penalty  or
interest 2.40 2 3 0.55 0.23 5
For tax 5.33 1 14 4.13 0.77 21 Income Tax
Appellate Tribunal For penalty  or
interest 2.25 1 4 1.26 0.56 4
For tax 2.95 1 10 2.69 0.91 10 High Court/
Supreme Court For penalty  or
interest -- -- -- -- -- 0
For tax 7.85 1 20 6.16 0.79 26 Total Assessment
years For penalty  or
interest 2.63 1 4 1.06 0.40 8
Table 21: Legal Compliance Costs and Assessment Proceedings
(Double-Log Regressions of Scaled Legal Compliance Costs in Rupees)
Scaling (Size) variable Size coefficient for number of
assessment years
Elasticity with respect to number of
assessment years
Turnover (in Rs.) 0.288 0.288
Book Value of Assets (in Rs.) 0.341 0.341
Employment (in numbers)   0.487* 0.487
Profit Before Tax/Loss Index       0.595*** 1.150
Net Tax Paid Index     0.579** 1.119
Note: Regressions are the same as in Table 7: R-square, observations and other coefficients are reported
           there as are notes on the regressions.Table 22: Voluntary Costs as a Percentage of Legal Compliance Costs
Average Coefficient of variation No. of observations
Internal Voluntary Costs 17.78 0.76 32
External Voluntary Costs 22.16 0.88 22
Total Legal Voluntary Costs* 19.11 0.91 38
Total Voluntary Costs including "Others/Unallocated"
Internal Voluntary Costs 19.99 0.82 32
External Voluntary Costs 43.08 0.71 22
Total Legal Voluntary Costs 24.73 0.89 38
Note: * Average total costs are below both internal and external costs because of differing numbers of observations: If either
component is missing, total voluntary costs are taken as equal to the other component.













Percentage of Tax Paid 0.03 1.20 0.14 0.23 0.08 0.33 1.47
Per Employee per Annum (in Rs) 4.06 133.03 126.30 148.37 81.14 98.58 0.59
% of Profit Before Tax 0.009 0.38 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.11 1.40









TDS for non-employees 42 18 18 4 2.4
TDS for employees 41 16 15 8 2.2
Audit requirements u/s 44AB 39 26 11 0 2.7
Valuation of perquisites to employees 39 17 10 8 2.3
Minimum Alternate Tax (u/s 115JA/115JB) 26 11 7 7 2.2
Non-resident withholding (u/s 195 etc.) 26 5 14 5 2.0
Loss carry forward and set off 22 6 11 3 2.2
Claiming export benefits (u/s 80HHC,
80HHE, 10A/ 10B etc.)
19 8 6 4 2.2
International tax provisions 19 8 6 5 2.2
Others (Inconsistencies with Companies
Act, depreciation provisions, establishment
costs in connection with free trade zones)
18 9 4 4 2.3
Tax collected at source 17 7 4 6 2.1
*Notes: Time taken High = 3, Time taken Average = 2, Time taken Low = 1.
             u/s: Under section.Table 25: Compliance Costs With Income Tax Provisions
(% of legal compliance cost)




Audit Requirements u/s 44AB 13.26 0.005 30.00 8.48 0.64 21
Claiming export benefits (u/s 80HHC,
80HHE, 10A/ 10B etc.) 10.04 0.005 30.00 9.82 0.98 11
TDS for employees 9.01 0.015 24.70 6.71 0.74 18
TDS for non employees 8.44 0.015 40.20 9.13 1.08 18
International tax provisions 6.75 2.000 15.00 5.68 0.84 4
Loss carry forward and set off 6.50 0.005 15.00 5.14 0.79 12
Valuation  of perquisites to employees 6.25 0.040 20.00 5.15 0.82 17
Income accruals 5.50 1.000 10.00 3.72 0.68 10
Non-resident withholding (u/s 195 etc.) 5.37 0.040 10.00 3.93 0.73 11
Minimum Alternate Tax (u/s
115JA/115JB) 5.29 0.010 10.00 3.73 0.70 7
All categories * 46.96 0.070 100.00 26.86 0.57 24
Notes: (1) u/s: Under section.
           (2) *: Two categories, tax collection at source and inconsistencies with the Companies Act each
 contributing 4% to 5% of costs are not shown, The average figure in the total row is not the column
                   sum due to missing observations. It has been computed from company by company totals.









Refunds 33 24 5 1 2.8
Scrutiny assessment procedures 37 22 6 4 2.6
Accounting for TDS 36 19 10 4 2.5
Appeals and litigation 33 17 7 4 2.5
Completion and filing corporation tax return 37 16 14 3 2.4
Obtaining clearances, approvals, etc. from
IT authorities









Accounting for IT purposes (u/s 132, 145A) 25 8 9 5 2.1
Note: * Time taken – High = 3, Average = 2, Low = 1.
Table 27: Cost of Compliance With Income Tax Administrative Procedures
(% of legal compliance cost)




Appeals and litigation 14.67 0.040 65.00 15.31 1.04 15
Scrutiny assessment procedures 14.50 0.005 50.00 11.78 0.81 14
Refunds 11.74 0.040 70.00 17.11 1.46 15
Completing and filing corporation tax
return 10.32 0.005 25.00  7.23 0.70 15
Accounting for TDS   9.47 0.005 25.00  6.75 0.71 15
For clearances, approvals, etc. from
IT authorities  6.51 1.000 15.60  4.57 0.70 9
Accounting for IT purposes (u/s 132,
145A)  5.14 0.005 12.00  3.80 0.74 7
All categories above* 43.07 0.020 100.00 25.85 0.60 23
Note: *: The average figure in the total row is not the column sum. It has been computed from company by
               company totals.Table 28: Problems Identified By Respondents in Open Ended Questions
Problem area Number of respondents
mentioning problem
Slow Assessments/Appeals procedure at various level 9
Complicated returns and complicated rules/lack of accountability in case of refunds/approvals
etc., delays in refunds/ follow up for refunds
9
Collection of TDS certificates from various customers and getting credit for the same (Note:
procedure now streamlined )
9
The complex scheme of the Act for granting allowances and disallowances, Complex maze of
provisions, concessions and rules
8
Delays in delivering orders/ tax orders 5
Lack of accountability and transparency in tax administration matters 5
Nontransparent and ambiguous terminology/tax laws. 4
Complexity in compliance with various procedures 4
Complex tax audit report 3
Need for elimination of tax categories both at Central and State level 1
Difficulty in compliance with transfer pricing regulations 1
Changes to extend the purview of prerequisites 1Appendix
A.  Response Rate
For the mailed survey, a list of 3500 company addresses
from all over the country was obtained from a large government
data base of corporation tax assesses according to a locationally
stratified random sample design. No other stratification criteria
could be employed given the structure of the data base. Of this,
1000 addresses were fatally incomplete while in another 206
cases, questionnaires were returned by the post office because
the address or addressee was unknown. Eleven trade
associations and chambers of commerce were also contacted and
1200 questionnaires handed over to their office bearers to
distribute to members with covering letters from the associations
themselves. Despite two rounds of reminders the response rate
remained low. So a further 200 questionnaires were distributed
after personal contact with companies in Mumbai. This generated
the bulk of responses (28 out of 45 usable responses). As a result,
the sample, though conceived as an anonymous stratified random
sample, degenerated into a "convenience" sample. The eventual
net response rate, excluding unusable responses, was an
unsatisfactory 1.15 percent.Table A1: Questionnaires Mailed to Individuals and Responses Received
Numbers % of initial
sample
Addresses received from database 3500 74.47
   of which addresses found incomplete 1000 (approx.) 21.28
Net received 2500 (approx.) 53.19
Add questionnaires mailed or hand delivered to industry associations 1200 25.53
Total addresses available/ questionnaires mailed or hand delivered to
industry associations
3700 (approx.) 78.72
Number not deliverable by post offices 206 4.38
Memo:
Questionnaires hand delivered after individual contact 200 4.26
   of which responses received 28
B. Basic Characteristics of Companies in the Sample
Table A2: Basic Company Information
Location
Location Delhi Mumbai Other Metro Others Total
Companies 2 32 5 4 43
Year of Establishment
Year Till 1947 1948 to 1960 1961 to 1970 1971 to 1980 After 1980#
Companies 7 4 3 5 22
Note: # There are 15 companies, which were established in 1991 or thereafter.Age of Companies (Years)
Average Minimum Maximum Stand. dev. No. of Observations
27.0 1 88 24.5 41
Employee Strength (Numbers)
Full Time Employees Below 20 21 to 100 101 to 500 501 to 1000 Above 1001
Companies 8 7 7 5 13
Average Minimum Maximum Stand. dev. No. of Observations
2240.48 2 23539 4504.9 40
Part time Employees
(in equivalent full time
employees)
0 1 to 25 26 to 50 51 to 200 201 and above
Companies 21 5 4 3 4
Average Minimum Maximum Stand. dev. No. of Observations
2004 1 30000 7468.1 37
Book Value of Assets (Rs. million)
Book Value Below 10 10 to 200 200 to 500 500 to 1000 Over 1000
Companies 10 8 7 7 9
Average Minimum Maximum Stand. dev. No. of Observations
100923 15 1559436 310089
Turnover (Rs. million)
Turnover Below 20 0 to 500 500 to 1000 1000 to 5000 Over 5000
Companies 6 12 7 8 8Average Minimum Maximum Stand. dev. No. of Observations
83416 0.7 1062000 213503 41
Profit Before Tax or PBT (Rs million)
Average Minimum Maximum Stand. dev. No. of Observations
Profit 1964.9 0.004 25670 5525.1 34
Loss -2387 -7600 -40.7 3460 6
C. Compliance Costs and Company Size: Tables
Table A3: Legal Compliance Costs as a Percentage of Turnover
Turnover Below Rs. 20
million
@




Rs 1 to 5 billion Over Rs 5 billion
Average 1.28 0.40 0.16 0.13
Coefficient of Variation 0.69 0.95 0.77 1.26
No of observations 4 12 7 8
Note: @: Excludes one outlier.
Table A4: Legal Compliance Costs Per Employee (in Rupees)
No. of Employees Below 20
@ 21 to100 101 to 500 501 to 1000 Above 1001
Average 20138 11818 2335 3729 1616
Coeff. of Variation 0.69 1.19 0.69 0.99
No. of observations 4 8 7 5
Note: @: Excludes two outliers.Table A5: Legal Compliance Costs as a Percentage of Book Value of Assets
Book value of assets Below Rs. 20
million
@




Rs 1 to 5 billion Over Rs 5 billion
Average 4.17 0.97 0.33 0.46
Coefficient of Variation 0.70 1.30 0.82 1.28
No of observations 7 14 7 2
Note: @: Excludes three outliers.
Table A6: Legal Compliance Costs as a Percentage of Profit Before Tax








Rs 1 to 5 billion Over Rs 5
billion
Average 1.71 8.38 2.20 0.22 0.17
Coefficient of Variation 1.03 1.00 1.21 N.A. 0.88
Number of observations 5 11 12 1 3
Note: *Excludes one outlier and one zero-profit company.
Table A7: Legal Compliance Costs as a Percentage of Income Tax  Paid





Rs 1 to 10
million






Average -22.87 164.18 17.55 12.40 0.59
Coefficient of Variation 0.51 1.01 0.93 1.65 0.37
Number of observations 2 6 12 10 2
Note: @: Excludes one outlier.
          #: Excludes one outlier.D. The Size of Tax Returns and Compliance Costs
Though regression analysis for the current sample does not
statistically support this, the number of pages of documents submitted
with tax returns has been identified in the literature as a useful summary
indicator of compliance costs (see Pope and Fayle, 1991). Sample
information is summarised in Table A8. There is a wide variation in the
average number of pages of documents submitted by companies, with
the number ranging between 9 and 3100. This is only partly linked to
company size. Scanty information available suggests that the average is
comparable to that in some countries with complex corporation tax
codes.
Table A8: Pages of Documents Submitted by the Company with
its Income Tax Return
Number of Pages
Average   326
Minimum       9
Maximum 3100
Standard Deviation    541
Number of observations     41
E. The Tax Cost to Companies of CAG Audit objections
Incorrect application of various tax provisions by the tax officials
burdens taxpayers who have their tax assessments revisited. Costs
associated with reopened assessments are implicitly reflected in
reported costs in this study though no separate estimates are available.
By examining the most expensive and most frequent mistakes made by
tax officials, additional information can be gained about problem areas.
Here objections by the Comptroller and Auditor General regarding
incorrect assessments by the income tax department – which almost
always lead to reopening of assessments – are reviewed.
In Table A9 the number and value of major audit objections by
the CAG in 2000-01 are summarised. The most serious problem is with
valuation of closing stocks of companies followed by the portmanteau
category "underassessment". Both of these are areas where a good deal
of discretion is available to assessing officers. Audit objections are made
when mistakes come to light during annual test checks by auditors.
However no information is available in CAG (2002) on the total number
of test checks carried out, though this was reported in previous years.Given that only a small proportion of cases are externally audited, in
many cases mistakes probably do not come to light. Of the next 4
categories in the table, items 3 to 6, three deal with areas where the tax
law is known to be complex and so could largely reflect genuine
mistakes by assessing officers which can be remedied by training. While
only internal evaluation of lapses can shed light on their causes, areas
where additional training is needed for income tax officials – or areas
which they deliberately ignore – are presumably reflected in their







expenditure Tax effect Number of cases
Incorrect valuation of closing stock   5633.2 5633.2 20
Underassessment of income and tax 450.6 660.9 1111.4 92
Incorrect computation of income of financial
corporations or business income 788.8 788.8 67
Incorrect carry forward/set off of losses 753.3 753.3 65
Over-assessment of income and tax 737.5 737.5 23
Irregular allowance of depreciation/   incorrect
rates of depreciation applied   591.0 591.0 67
Other types of incorrect assessment of taxes*     984.0 55
Total 10599.2  389
Memo:
Total tax effect of all audit objections     12883.8 618
Total tax effect as a percentage of
 corporate income tax collections 3.6
Notes: * Irregular exemption; Excess deduction under Chapter VIA; Incorrect allowance of deduction;
               Incorrect allowance of relief in respect of profits from export business; Mistake in allowance of
              deduction of profits derived from services provided to foreign tourists.
              Detailed explanation of items in the table is in Chattopadhyay and Das-Gupta (2002) .
Source:CAG (2002)References
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